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COMMENTS
SENTENCING UNDER SECTION 5010(D) OF THE FEDERAL
YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974)
Petitioner, 19 years old, was eligible for sentencing1 under the Fed-
eral Youth Corrections Act.2 The district court, however, made no
mention of the Act at any time during the sentencing proceedings.
Upon consideration of a postsentencing motion by defense counsel,3 the
1. Petitioner had pleaded guilty to a charge of knowingly and intentionally possess-
ing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (19,70) and 18 U.S.C.
1 (2) (1970), a misdemeanor offense.
2. 18 U.S.C. H§ 5005-26 (1970). Prior to sentencing, both defense counsel and
the government prosecutor stated that petitioner might be eligible for a sentence under
the Act. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 427 (1974). 18 U.S.C. § 5010
(1970) provides for sentencing as follows:
(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need
commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place
the youth offender on probation.
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and
the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provision of law
other than this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprison-
ment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody
of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter
until discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017(c) of this chap-
ter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to de-
rive maximum benefit from treatment by the Division prior to the expiration
of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of impris-
onment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody
of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter
for any further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or of-
fenses of which he stands convicted or until discharged by the Division as pro-
vided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.
(d) If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit
from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the
youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
(e) If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth of-
fender will derive benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may
order that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for obser-
vation and study at an appropriate classification center or agency. Within
sixty days from the date of the order, or such additional period as the court
may grant, the Division shall report to the court its findings.
3. Defense counsel filed a motion seeking relief pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32
(d) (withdrawal of plea of guilty may be permitted by court "to correct manifest injus-
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district court stated that section 5010(d) of the Act did not require, as
a precondition to imposition of an adult sentence, an explicit finding
that the petitioner would not derive benefit from treatment under the
provisions of the Act. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,4
holding that a finding of "no benefit" could be implied from the record
as a whole.5 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, and held:
A finding of "no benefit" from treatment under the Act must be stated
explicitly, although supporting reasons need not be offered.6
Traditional sentencing doctrine7 is premised on the belief that the
tice"), FED. R. CM. P. 35 (correction of sentence imposed in illegal manner), and 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), which provides as follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Con-
gress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that
the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.
4. United States v. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973).
5. Id. at 851:
The record here supports the implication that after the petitioner's trial counsel
had raised the possibility of sentencing the petitioner as a youth offender, the
trial court determined that the petitioner would not derive benefit from treat-
ment pursuant to section 5010(b) or (c).
This statement was interpreted by the Supreme Court as a holding by the court of ap-
peals that the imposition of a split sentence upon petitioner after his counsel had raised
the possibility of sentencing under the Act satisfied § 5010(d).
6. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974). Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court and Mr. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring
in the result. While the concurrence supported the judgment of the Court insofar as
it reversed and remanded for failure of the district court to make the requisite "no bene-
fit" finding, Mr. Justice Marshall would have required, in addition, a statement of rea-
sons supporting the finding. The concurrence also objected to "dicta, on the question
of appellate review of a § 5010(d) adult sentence, an issue not before this Court." Id.
at 460.
7. See generally K. DAvis, DISCErTONARY JUSTiCE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969); R. DAwsoN, SanrmNdNco: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENmT AND CONmDTONS
oF SENTENcE (1969); Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. OIN. L. REv. 1
(1972); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARv. L. Rnv. 904 (1962); Special Issue: Sentencing, 53 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 45, 50-78
(1969); Symposium, Sentencing, 23 LAw & CoNTEM,. POn. 399 (1958). See also
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 465
(1961).
MODEL PENAL. CODE § 1.02(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) lists eight general purposes
underlying the Code's sentencing and treatment provisions:
(a) To prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) To promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders;
(c) To safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbi-
trary punishment;https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/4
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sentence should reflect the facts and circumstances of each individual
human being; the punishment should fit the offender as well as the of-
fense.' To achieve any degree of individualization, the sentencing
judge must necessarily wield some measure of discretionary power.'
Wide discretion may be freely exercised, provided that the sentence
imposed is within the generally broad limits set by the legislature.'
Concern for the inevitably disparate results of such a policy" is offset
by a desire to avoid the equally undesirable alternative of designating
an immutable statutory penalty for every offense.' Thus, except for
"egregious departures from lawful criteria," the discretionary pro-
nouncement of sentence remains immune from appellate review.'"
(d) To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be im-
posed on conviction of an offense;
(e) To differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization
in their treatment;
(f) To define, co-ordinate and harmonize the powers, duties and functions
of the courts and of administrative officers and agencies responsible for deal-
ing with offenders;
(g) To advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and
knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of offenders;
(h) To integrate responsibility for the administration of the correctional
system in a State Department of Correction [or other single department or
agency].
8. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
9. "[I1n no legal system, however minute and detailed its body of rules, is justice
administered wholly by rule and without recourse to the will of the judge and his per-
sonal sense of what should be done to achieve a just result in the case before him." 2
R. PoUND, JUIrsPRuDENCE 355 (1959).
10. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386 (1958); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293 (6th Cir. 1958);
Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930). In Dorszynski the Court stated:
"[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute
under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end." 418 U.S. at 431.
11. See Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25
RuToERs L. REv. 207 (1971); Frankel, supra note 7; 20 CATH. U.L. Rav. 748 (1971).
12. See K. DAvis, supra note 7; Kadish, supra note 7.
13. Frankel, supra note 7, at 23. Judge Frankel adds that the United States is the
only nation in the free world where such a system exists. Id.
United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1971), sets out four circum-
stances in which appellate review can be appropriate. The presence in a trial judge's
determination of sentence of (1) improper consideration of certain factors, (2) improper
reliance on false information, (3) a failure to evaluate relevant information, or (4) an
inflexible sentencing policy should result in a remand for reconsideration of the sentence
to be imposed. The failure to exercise discretion caused remands in United States v.
Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d
940, 945 (4th Cir. 1969). In Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1958), the
Supreme Court stated:
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Every state has adopted special procedures to individualize treatment
of juvenile offenders. 14  In the federal system, the Juvenile Delin-
quency Act of 193815 provides for offenders under the age of 18. Not
until the adoption of the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950 did
Congress direct regulation towards those persons in the vulnerable age
bracket between 18 and 22.10 Described as the most comprehensive
[When in a situation like this the District Court appears not to have exer-
cised its discretion in the light of the reversal of the judgment but, in effect,
to have sought merely to justify the original sentence, this Court has no alter-
native except to exercise its supervisory power over the administration of jus-
tice in the lower federal courts by setting aside the sentence of the District
Court.
'ee also Proceedings, Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231 (1959).
The principal theory advanced in support of such a system is that a well-considered
sentence imposed by a trial judge who has had the opportunity to observe the defendant
throughout the trial and sentencing process should not be subject to adjustment by ap-
pellate judges reviewing a cold record. For other arguments pro and con appellate re-
view, see Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 257-75 (1962) (re-
marks of Judge Kaufman and Chief Judge Sobeloff). For a discussion of the impact
of the Model Sentencing Act on discretion and review, see Institute on Sentencing, 42
F.ILD. 175 (1966).
14. See, e.g., Amold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law, CAL. WELF. & INST NS CODE §
500-945 (Deering 1969, Supp. 1974); Juvenile Court Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §
701-1 to 707-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972, Supp. 1974); N.Y. FAMILY Or. AcT H9 111-1119
(McKinney 1963, Supp. 1974). For a commentary on the failures of the system as a
whole, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AN YOUTH CRIME 7-9 (1967).
15. 18 U.S.C. H§ 5031-37 (1970).
16. The Act defines a youth offender as "a person under the age of twenty-two years
at the time of conviction." 18 U.S.C. § 5006(e) (1970). That age group was selected
because it was felt that personalities at that age were malleable. Also, since recidivism
rates were high, punishment under the adult correction system was not producing accept-
able results. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1950).
A committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States studied the general sub-
ject of punishment, paying particular attention to the problems of youthful offenders,
and published a report in 1942. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMm-ITEE ON TREATMENT OF
YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, in REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIE CoMMITrEE
ON PUNISHMENT FOR CIME (1942) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. See also AL
MODEL YOUTr COR.RECON AUTHORI ACT at vii (Official Draft 1940); T. SnLLIN,
ThE CmrNALry OF YoUTH 37-55 (1940). For an analysis of the Youth Offenders
Act proposed by the committee and a comparison of it and the ALl Model Youth Cor-
rection Authority Act, see Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: Past Concern in
Need of Legislative Reappraisal, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 229, 233 (1972). The recom-
mended correctional treatment was based primarily on the English Borstal System. H.R.
REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
The Borstal idea grew out of an 1894 commission report which recommended special
treatment for youths aged 16 to 21, and segregation of this group from hardened adult
criminals. Providing instruction in a trade rather than retributive punishment, the Bor-
stal System was predicated on the principles of "(1) flexibility, (2) individualization,
[Vol. 1974:741
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federal statute concerned with sentencing, 7 the Act seeks to "substi-
tute for retributive punishment methods of training and treatment de-
signed to correct and prevent anti-social tendencies. It departs from
the mere punitive idea of dealing with criminals and looks primarily
to the objective idea of rehabilitation.' 1 8 To this end, the Act provides
a number of sentencing alternatives for the district court judge. 19 The
judge may place the youthful defendant on probation,20 commit him
to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment,2' or sentence him
under any applicable adult penalty provision. The adult penalty may
be imposed "[i]f the court shall find that the youth offender will not
derive benefit from treatment *"22 The congressional purpose in
imposing the finding requirement is unclear.23
and (3) emphasis on the intangibles." H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1950). Begun in a wing of Bedford Prison, the experimental treatment of the youth
steadily expanded until, by 1950, there were thirteen institutions ranging from walled
prisons to completely open camps in the country. Id. at 4-7; see Hearings on S. 1114
& 2609 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
60-65 (1949) (remarks of Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips). See generally W. HEALY & B.
ALPER, CRIMINAL YOUTH AND THE BosrAL SYsTEM (1941); R. HOOD, BORSTAL RE-
ASSESSED (1965); Fry, The Borstal System, in PENAL REFORM IN ENGLAND 127 (L. Rad-
zinowicz & J. Turner eds. 1940); Note, supra.
The Report's recommendations were incorporated into the Federal Corrections Act of
1943. See H.R. 2140, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. II, § 3 (1943); S. 895, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess., tit. III, § 2 (1943). Largely because of controversies concerning the adult pro-
visions, the Federal Corrections Act failed to pass, but its provisions regarding youth
offenders were adopted virtually intact by Congress in the Federal Youth Corrections
Act of 1950. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 10-14 (1950).
17. United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1970).
21. Id. §§ 5010(b), (c).
22. Id. § 5010(d).
23. There are no remarks in the legislative history materials directly on point
Stating that "nowhere in the committee reports, at the committee hearings or in the de-
bates on the floor is there any indication that a judge is precluded from imposing a regu-
lar adult sentence unless he first finds that an eligible defendant will not receive any
benefit from the Youth Act sentence," Senator Beall proposed a bill to amend § 5010
to read as follows:
"(d) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preclude the court, in any
case, from sentencing a youth offender under any other applicable penalty pro-
vision."
118 CONG. REc. 6776-77 (1972) (remarks of Senator Beall). Senator Beall's avowed
motive in affirming the discretion available to the trial court was to place priority on
the rights and protection of lawful citizens. The bill was referred to the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary where it died.
745
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Difficulties in judicial interpretation of the Act have centered around
section 5010(d).24 While it was generally agreed that the section re-
quired a finding that the youth offender would derive no benefit from
a sentence under section 5010(b) or (c) before he or she could be
sentenced under other applicable penal statutes,2' three distinct posi-
tions regarding the expression of this finding emerged from the circuit
courts: some circuits stated that such a finding could be implied from
the record;26 others agreed that the statute permitted an implicit finding
of "no benefit" but indicated a preference for an explicit finding;2 7 and
a 'third group required that the finding be explicit and be supported
by reasons expressed on the record.28  It was to resolve this conflict
in the circuits that the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari
in Dorszynski v. United States.
Operating under 'the premise that appellate review ends once it is
found that the sentence imposed is within the limitations set by stat-
24. There have been no constitutional challenges regarding general congressional
power to enact the Act. Past litigation has questioned the constitutionality of imposing
an indeterminate sentence of up to six years for an offense which carried a shorter stat-
utory sentence. The well-settled view is that benefits derived under the Act sufficiently
balance the prospect of a longer confinement. See, e.g., United States v. Crichlow, 459
F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1972); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958);
Guidry v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir.
1970). The consequences of a failure by the judge to advise the defendant of the possi-
bility of sentence under the Act before accepting the defendant's guilty plea were exam-
ined in Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963) (sentence under Act
rendered constitutionally invalid). See also Pelton v. United States, 465 F.2d 952 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 935 (1973) (explanation given held sufficient); Cun-
ningham v. United States, 461 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1972) (court's explanation in conjunc-
tion with that of government counsel held sufficient). The Act was upheld against a
challenge that it provided for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
courts in United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Standley v.
United States, 318 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 917 (1964); Guidry
v. United States, supra.
25. See generally Note, Sentencing Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act: The
Need for an Explicit Finding and a Statement of Reasons, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 1071 (1973).
But see 118 CONG. RIc. 6776 (1972) (remarks of Senator Beall).
26. United States v. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 424
(1974); Williams v. United States, 476 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1973).
27. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
869 (1973); Jarratt v. United States, 471 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 969 (1973).
28. Brooks v. United States, 497 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kay-
lor, 491 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane); cf. United States v. Schencker, 486 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.
1973).
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ute,29 the Court in Dorszynski began its analysis with an examination
of the purpose,30 philosophy,31 and treatment32 authorized by the Act.33
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act did the Court find any
statement pointing to a congressional intent to restrict the trial judge's
traditional role in sentencing.34 There were no indications, for ex-
ample, of a desire to limit sentencing options or to provide for appellate
review. Far from believing that Congress had departed from estab-
lished sentencing doctrine, the Court concluded that the Act enlarges,
rather than restricts, the trial judge's options, thus actually broadening
the scope of judicial sentencing discretion.33 While a finding of "no
benefit" is required, "[literal compliance with the Act can be satisfied
by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the
alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth of-
fender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act." 36
Supporting reasons need not be stated because appellate review would
be unavailable 7
The concurring opinion agreed that a "no benefit" finding was a con-
dition precedent to the imposition of an adult sentence on a youth of-
29. 418 U.S. at 431. Had there been a contention that the district court had relied
on improper or inaccurate information, review would have been possible.
30. "The Act was thus designed to provide a better method for treating young of-
fenders convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable age bracket [ages 16-22], to re-
habilitate them and restore normal behavior patterns." Id. at 433.
3 1. The Court found the fundamental elements of the program to be the following:
(1) the sentence was to fit the person, not the crime, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5014, 5015 (1970);
(2) a broad range of treatment was to provide maximum flexibility, id. §§ 5011, 5015;
and (3) offenders were to be segregated from more hardened criminals, id. § 5015. 418
U.S. at 434.
32. Treatment included conditional release (probation) and unconditional discharge;
under certain circumstances the conviction would be set aside. 418 U.S. at 434. The
full range of sentencing alternatives is set out in note 2 supra.
33. The Court's sole concern was the validity of the sentence in terms of § 5010(d).
Although petitioner raised a due process issue in the brief submitted to the Supreme
Court, the Court did not address the question since it had not been raised before the
lower courts or in the petition for certiorari.
34. "We will not assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well-
established doctrine without a clear expression to disavow it." 418 U.S. at 441.
35. That is, by offering a broader range of dispositional alternatives. Id. at 440.
36. Id. at 444.
37. The "no benefit" finding is not a "substantive standard" according to the Court.
Id. at 441. The only purpose for requiring a statement of reasons would be to facilitate
appellate review, and thereby limit the discretion vested in the district judge, i.e. to de-
part from well-established sentencing doctrine. Thus, once it is clear that the Act has
been considered as an option and has been rejected, no appellate review is warranted.
Vol. 1974:741] 747
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fender. The Act, according to Justice Marshall, presented a "pre-
ferred sentencing alternative" ' which must be used unless a "no bene-
fit" finding is made. 9 Pointing to the clear words of the statute 0 and
a reading of the legislative history that emphasized the Act's foundation
upon -the English Borstal System,41 Justice Marshall rejected the notion
that a mere express statement of "no 'benefit" would satisfy the Act's
mandates. He felt that such an interpretation would render the finding
requirement a nullity: the ritual recitation assures only that the judge
was aware of the Act and rejected it.42  A supporting statement of
reasons, on the other hand, would not only give effect to congressional
concern that the rehabilitation of youth offenders be given priority,48
38. According to Justice Marshall, several aspects of the legislative history support
the view that Congress intended the Act to be a preferred alternative. First, S. REP.
No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949) implies that the judge would have to find the
youth offender "incorrigible" -to sentence him under other applicable provisions of law.
Secondly, in 1943 Senator Kilgore observed that, given the requisite finding, no more
than ten percent of eligible offenders would have to be sentenced as adults. 418 U.S.
at 448 (Marshall, J., concurring), quoting Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1943). Finally, H.R.
REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1950) estimates a seventy percent rehabilitation
rate, even given instances where youthful offender treatment may fail.
39. 418 U.S. at 449.
40. "Section 5010(d) does not say the sentencing court must merely consider the
treatment option provided by the Act; it says in the most uncompromising terms that
the court must find the youth 'will not benefit' from YCA treatment as a prerequisite
to imposing an adult sentence. The use of the words 'shall find' emphasizes the manda-
tory nature of that finding." Id. Section 5010(e), which provides for observa-
tion of the youth offender and a report on the § 5010(d) benefit question, lends weight
to this position.
41. For a brief explanation of the Borstal System and a citation to general sources,
see note 16 supra.
Whereas, prior to 1948, the Court of Quarter Sessions or Assize could exercise free
discretion to accept or reject recommendations of the Prison Commissioners, §§ 17(2)
and (3) of -the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 "limited the haphazard use of imprisonment
by requiring magistrates to give reasons in writing for their decision to sentence a youth
to prison and to 'obtain and consider information about the circumstances' in all cases."
R. Hoo, supra note 16, at 72. If the judge does decide that the Borstal training is
the best alternative under the circumstances, his discretion ends with this determination;
he cannot specify the length of sentence or even to which Borstal institution the youth
offender will be sent. W. HEALY & B. ALPER, supra note 16, at 77.
42. 418 U.S. at 452.
43. Justice Marshall cited H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950) to
support his position. The Act "departs from the mere punitive idea of dealing with
criminals and looks primarily to the objective idea of rehabilitation." 418 U.S. at 448.
In the limited sense that the Act requires the judge to consider rehabilitation paramount,
the sentencing discretion of the trial judge is necessarily circumscribed.
[Vol. 1974:741
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but would also be beneficial from the perspective of general social pol-
icy.44
Both opinions recognized the requirement of some sort of "find-
ing,"" which, if substantive, would affect established sentencing pro-
cedure by imposing limitations on judicial discretion. 46 As the Court
pointed out, nowhere in the legislative history does a clear congress-
ional intent to alter the traditional prerogatives of federal judges
emerge. Rather, the documents are littered with words and phrases
evincing deference to judicial choice.47  While Justice Marshall was
clearly correct in maintaining that Congress viewed sentencing under
the Act as a preferred alternative, 4  his conclusion that such a view
44. A statement of reasons would serve to
(1) rationalize the sentencing process;
(2) decrease disparities in sentencing;
(3) help judges develop a consistent set of sentencing principles;
(4) aid correctional authorities;
(5) help the defendant's attorney insure that a sentence was not based on in-
accuracies or misinformation;
(6) facilitate rehabilitation of the offender by avoiding any feeling that his
sentence was arbitrary;
(7) legitimize the sentencing process as perceived by the general public; and
(8) insure that the judge
(a) is aware that the Act is applicable;
(b) is aware of his discretion under the Act;
(c) knows the pertinent facts relating to the defendant; and
(d) has related the facts to the law.
418 U.S. at 455.
45. This would be a finding of fact. Professor Davis contrasts reasons with find-
ings: "Reasons differ from findings in that reasons relate to law, policy, and discretion
rather than to facts." K. DAvis, ADmIraASvn LAw Tpxr § 16.07, at 326 (3d ed.
1972).
46. If the standard were substantive, the trial judge could still exercise his discretion
and impose sentence outside of the Act, but he would be required to justify his decision.
Traditionally, a trial judge need not support his sentencing decision by a statement of
reasons or in any other way. See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text. Further,
ince the Act mandates that rehabilitation is the paramount aim in sentencing youth of-
fenders, a judge could not justify a sentence by stressing the need for deterrence, inca-
pacitation, or retribution. An attempt so to justify a sentence would be reviewable as
an abuse of discretion.
While discretion might be reshaped, a substantive standard would not necessarily
transform current conceptions of appellate review. Appellate review could be limited
to allegations of abuses of discretion or of clearly erroneous findings.
47. For example, the only remarks on the floor of the Senate were delivered by Sen-
ator Kilgore, the bill's sponsor. "The judges say that the bill will give them an addi-
tional facility, although use of the system provided by the bill will not be mandatory."
96 CoNG. REc. 8267 (1950). "The bill will not be compulsory in any sense of the word
. . Id. at 1283 . See 418 U.S. at 438.
48. Proponents presented the Act as a virtual panacea to correct the inadequacies
of the existing methods of treating youth offenders. See note 38 supra.
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would necessarily result in a change in the nature of judicial discretion
seems of questionable validity.4 9 Justice Marshall, however, did coun-
ter the Court's assertion that a nonsubstantive standard would render
a statement of reasons superfluous 0 with a forceful social policy argu-
ment.5'
Rejecting both the concept of a restrictive substantive standard and
that of a flexible system of implicit findings,5 2 'the Court has opted for
an alternative approach with few repercussions. A simple expression
of "no benefit" satisfies the literal meaning of section 5010(d) without
seriously impinging on traditional judicial discretion. A ritual recital
of a single phrase, however, does not in any way insure that the court
is aware of pertinent facts relating to the youth offender or that the
judge has related these facts to the Act in a principled fashion. The
requirement merely provides assurance that the judge knew of the ap-
plicability of the Act and, for acceptable or unacceptable reasons, chose
not to apply it to the defendant. 3  Criminal justice processes will be
expedited by the Court's formulation. Future sentences imposed un-
der the Act by the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion
will be final if either a sentence under the Act has been utilized or
a "no benefit" statement has been made. When 'the "no benefit" find-
ing has been expressed, no review of the sentence will be possible; fail-
ure to make an explicit statement will be held clear error.54  The ne-
cessity for case-by-case, ad hoc determinations will be avoided. Requir-
ing form without content also serves to maintain established practices
until a legislative decision regarding 'both discretion and appellate re-
view of sentencing is made.
49. See note 47 supra.
50. See note 37 supra.
51. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. But see note 53 infra.
52. 'To hold that a 'no benefit' finding is implicit each time a sentence under the
Act is not chosen would render § 5010(d) nugatory; to hold that something more
is necessary to support the inference that must be found in the record would cre-
ate an ad hoc rule." 418 U.S. at 444. Important policy considerations militate against
placing the burden of case-by-case examinations on already overburdened appellate
courts.
53. Alternatively, a required statement of reasons may 'be of dubious benefit as well,
particularly where such reasons are not to be subject to close scrutiny under ordinary
circumstances. A judge may put forward such reasons as will prove acceptable to soci-
ety, whatever his true bases for decision. Cf. K. DAVIs, supra note 7, at 105.
54. See United States v. Allen, Criminal No. 106-72 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 15, 1974) (ap-
pellate court, in light of Dorszynski decision, refused to review supporting reasons ex-
pressed by trial court).
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Thus, sentencing discretion remains virtually untouched by the Dor-
szynski decision, as do the traditional limitations placed on appellate
review of sentencing. If there is to be reform in this area, it will be
legislative rather than judicial.55
55. Suggestions for judicial reform generally concentrate on the structuring of dis-
cretion through imposing appellate review and requiring a statement of reasons in sup-
port of conclusions. See K. DAvis, supra note 7; Kadish, supra note 7; Kimball & New-
man, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat and Response, 14 CRIME
& DELiNQ. 1 (1968); Rubin, Sentences Must Be Rationally Explained, 42 F.R.D. 203,
212 (1966); Symposium, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962); Wyzan-
dt, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1952). See
also ABA PROJECT ON MINMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMMAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
INo TO APPELLATE REviEw OF SENTENCES (1968).
While the Model Penal Code and its advocates assume that an increase in legislative
control is needed, controversy continues as to how much control is desirable. See R.
DAWSON, supra note 7. But see Frankel, supra note 7, at 46, 54: "Every factor re-
viewed in sentencing calls for a judgment of policy, suited exactly for legislative action
and not for random variation from case to case .... Sentencing is today a wasteland
in the law. It calls, above all, for regulation by law. .. .
The Act specifically has been criticized for causing a lack of standardization in ap-
proach by a failure to delineate guidelines. Note, The Federal Youth Corrections
Act: Past Concern in Need of Legislative Reappraisal, 11 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 229,
254-57 (1972).
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